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STATE JURISDICTION OVER INTERSTATE
TELEPHONIC CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
A picks up his telephone and dials B's telephone number. B answers
his telephone and the following conversation ensues:
A: I've got a line on a bank job I figured you might be interested in.
This safe's begging for a break-in.
B: I've got no cash, and I'm gonna need a lot real soon... if you think
it's a good deal, you know you can count on me.
A: I'm glad you're in... Now, this is the deal...
At common law, A and B have formed a criminal conspiracy.I If A
and B are both in the same state, they are subject to prosecution for
criminal conspiracy in that state. 2 If A and B are in different states, however,
determining the location of the conspiracy for the purpose of vesting a
court or courts with criminal jurisdiction is problematic. 3 Common-law

1. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CnNA.i LAW § 6.4 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter LAFAvE]
(discussing origin and elements of criminal conspiracy). A common-law criminal conspiracy
consists of an agreement between two or more persons to achieve an unlawful end, or a lawful
end through unlawful means. Id. The agreement is the act component of the crime, and the
intent to commit an unlawful act is the mental state component of the crime. Id. The crime
is complete and subject to prosecution, therefore, when the conspirators make an agreement,
regardless of whether the conspirators ultimately achieve the unlawful goal of the conspiracy.
Id.; see 4

WHA tON'S CRsNnAL LAw

§§ 721-40 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1981 & Supp. 1987)

(surveying common law of conspiracy); 16 Am. JuR. 2D Conspiracy §§ 1-2, 10, 15 (1979 &
Supp. 1987) (noting elements of criminal conspiracy); 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy §§ 34-35 (1967

& Supp. 1987) (same);

Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 5.03 (1985) (codifying and extending common-

law conspiracy). The Model Penal Code defines conspiracy as an agreement to engage in crime
coupled with an overt act in furtherance of the crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (1985). If
the crime that is the object of the agreement is a first or second degree felony, however, the
Model Penal Code does not require an overt act in furtherance of the crime. Id.; see infra
notes 27-38 (discussing statutory overt act requirement of conspiracy).
2. See 16 AM. Jim. 2D Conspiracy § 21 (1979 & Supp. 1987) (noting that state court
has jurisdiction to prosecute criminal conspiracy when either agreement or overt act in
furtherance of conspiracy occurs within state); 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 83 (1967 & Supp.
1987) (noting that indictment for conspiracy is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on state court
if indictment alleges that either agreement or act in furtherance of conspiracy occurred within
state). Criminal jurisdiction, like civil jurisdiction, is of two types. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 107 (1961 & Supp. 1987) (discussing criminal jurisdiction). To try a case, the court
must have both subject matter jurisdiction over the crime and personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Id. §§ 12748. Interstate telephonic conspiracies, which are the subject of this
article, present problems of subject matter jurisdiction to courts. State extradition statutes
govern the courts' personal jurisdiction over the conspirators in any conspiracy. Id.
3. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 361 (1912) (noting that, when location of
conspiratorial agreement is unknown, assertion of jurisdiction is problematic); infra notes 2327 and accompanying text (discussing inapplicability of common-law territorial jurisdiction to
interstate telephonic conspiracies). The dearth of case law on the jurisdictional question which
interstate telephonic conspiracies present suggests that state courts generally assume jurisdiction
over interstate telephonic conspiracies without addressing the courts' power to do so. A
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criminal jurisdictional principles are territorial in nature, .and dictate that
each state has jurisdiction only over crimes that occur within the state's
boundaries. 4 In the interstate telephone hypothetical, the agreement that
constitutes the crime of conspiracy occurs in the telephone wires between
the two states. 5 Thus, the traditional method of determining jurisdiction
under territorial principles is not directly applicable to interstate telephonic
conspiracies. 6 Solving this jurisdictional problem requires adoption of a
nonterritorial principle on which to base criminal jurisdiction for interstate
conspiracies. 7 An analysis of the states' interests in asserting jurisdiction
over conspiracies and of the defendants' due process interests suggests as a
solution to the jurisdictional problem a departure from common-law territorial jurisdictional principles and adoption of a protective approach to
jurisdiction.' Under a protective approach to jurisdiction, the state or states

defendant, however, may not waive or consent to a court's inappropriate assertion of criminal
jurisdiction over a crime that the court does not have the authority to decide. See, e.g., Harris
v. State, 46 Del. 111,
-, 82 A.2d 387, 388 (1951) (noting that court cannot proceed to
hear case without validly asserting subject matter jurisdiction over crime); State v. Fisher, 270
N.C. 315, 318, 154 S.E.2d 333, 336 (1967) (same); State ex rel. Lea v. Brown, 166 Tenn. 669,
-,
64 S.W.2d 841, 848 (1933) (same), cert. denied 292 U.S. 638 (1934). See generally 21
AM. Jum. 2D Criminal Law § 339 (1981 & Supp. 1987) (noting that defendant may not consent
to subject matter jurisdiction over crimes that are not properly before court).
4. See Berge, CriminalJurisdiction and the TerritorialPrinciple, 30 MICH. L. Rv. 238,
238-69 (1931) (discussing territorial principle of criminal jurisdiction); Levitt, JurisdictionOver
Crimes, 16 J. Canim. L. & CRMINOLoGy 316, 316-37 (1925) (same); Perkins, The Territorial
Principle in Common Law, 22 HASTIn s L. J. 1155, 1155-72 (1971) (same); infra notes 10-22
and accompanying text (same). See generally 21 Am. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 343 (1981 &
Supp. 1987) (discussing common-law criminal jurisdiction principles that vest state in which
crime occurred with jurisdiction over offense); 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 133 (1961 & Supp.
1987) (same).
5. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912) (noting that gist of conspiracy
is agreement); Dealy v. United States, 152 U.S. 539, 547 (1894) (noting that gist of conspiracy
is conspiratorial agreement); 16 Am. JuR. 2v Conspiracy § 10 (1979 & Supp. 1987) (noting
that place where agreement occurs is situs of offense of criminal conspiracy); 15A C.J.S.
Conspiracy § 36 (1967 & Supp. 1987) (same). See generally LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 6.4(d)
(discussing agreement as gist of conspiracy offense).
6. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing territorial principle of
criminal jurisdiction).
7. See LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 2.9(c) (discussing non-territorial bases for criminal
jurisdiction); Berge, supra note 4, at 264-68 (discussing protective principle of jurisdiction);
George, ExtraterritorialApplication of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. Rav. 609, 613-38 (1966)
(discussing nonterritorial approaches to criminal jurisdiction); infra notes 82-107 and accompanying text (discussing nonterritorial, protective approach to criminal jurisdiction over interstate telephonic conspiracies); cf. Note, Jurisdiction Over Interstate Felony Murder, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1431, 1447-57 (1983) (discussing application of nonterritorial principles of criminal
jurisdiction to interstate felony murders).
8. See State v. Mueller, 44 Wis. 2d 387, 395, 171 N.W.2d 414, 418 (1969) (holding that
statute regulating marriage of divorced father with in-state dependents could have extraterritorial
effect). In State v. Mueller the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that, in determining whether
a statute can have extraterritorial effect, a court should balance the legitimate protectible
interests of a state against inconvenience to the accused and invasion upon the sovereignty of
sister states. Id.; see Note, supra note 7, at 1450 n.104 (noting that courts apply interest
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threatened by the object of the conspiracy can assert jurisdiction over the
conspiracy, regardless of where the conspirators formed the agreement. 9
Common-law criminal jurisdiction historically has used territorial principles that limit state jurisdiction on the basis of the state's physical
boundaries to determine whether a court has jurisdiction over a crime.' 0
Under the territorial rationale a state has the power to condemn the acts
of its citizens and of aliens while they are present within the state's

analysis to resolve conflict of law issues, but that interest analysis is also appropriate for
resolving jurisdictional issues); infra notes 61-81 and accompanying text (analyzing state's
interests in prosecuting interstate telephonic conspiracy).
9. See infra notes 82-125 and accompanying text (discussing application of protective
principle of jurisdiction to interstate telephonic conspiracies).
10. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03, at 36 (1985) (discussing territorial jurisdiction);
Berge, supra note 4, at 238-48 (discussing common-law tradition of territorial criminal jurisdiction); George, supra note 7, at 609-12 (same); Leflar, ExtrastateEnforcement of Penal and
Governmental Claims, 46 HARv. L. REv. 193, 193-201 (1932) (same); Levitt, supra note 4, at
316-29 (same); Perkins, supra note 4, at 1155-63 (same); Rotenberg, ExtraterritorialLegislative
Jurisdiction and the State CriminalLaw, 38 TEx. L. REv. 763, 773 (1960) (same); Note, supra
note 7, at 1433-36 (same). See generally 21 AM. JuR. 2D CriminalLaw § 343 (1981 & Supp.
1987) (discussing territorial principles of jurisdiction); 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 133 (1961 &
Supp. 1987) (same).
The development of a territorial theory of criminal jurisdiction began in the earliest days
of British civilization, when the overriding concern of the government was keeping the peace.
See Perkins, supra note 4, at 1157 (discussing origins of territorial principle). The law in early
England characterized all crimes as violations of the Crown's peaceful property, and thus, all
trials took place in the Crown's dominion. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03, at 37 (discussing
reasons for development of territorial principle). Additionally, the criminal system relied on a
trial by jurors who had knowledge of the crime, and therefore, the trial logically took place
where the crime occurred. Id. One commentator has suggested that the historic foundation
for the territorial principle has three elements. Levitt, supra note 4, at 325-28. First, primitive
religious notions of deities that controlled specific areas of life evolved into the concept that
a ruler only can punish a crime where it occurs. Id. at 325. Second, within the ancient societies
the community had responsibility for its own offenders. Id. at 326. The community was
responsible for the acts of its members, and the physical boundaries of a group's territory
determined who was in which group. Id. Finally, the development of the concept of trial by
jury was very important to the evolution of the territorial principle. Id. at 327. In ancient
trials, the jurors were the witnesses and testified about facts and events about which they had
personal knowledge. Id. The jurors represented the community, and the responsibility of the
community stopped at its boundary lines. Id. Therefore, criminal jurisdiction also stopped at
the boundary line. Id.
Territorial jurisdiction is one of several types of international jurisdictional principles. See
Perkins, supra note 4, at 1155 (listing four different theories of international criminal jurisdiction). See generally Harvard Law School Research in International Law, Draft Convention
on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935) (discussing
international theories of criminal jurisdiction). Most courts define four principles of jurisdiction:
territorial, nationality, protective, and universality. Id. at 445. The territoriality principle
determines jurisdiction on the basis of the physical boundaries of the sovereign. Id. The
nationality principle determines jurisdiction on the basis of the offender's citizenship. Id. The
protective principle examines the national interest that the offense injured, and the universality
principle provides for jurisdiction on the basis of which country has custody of the offender.
Id.
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boundaries." Conversely, the criminal laws of a state have no extraterritorial
effect.' 2 One state may not enforce the laws of another state, nor may any
state enforce its own laws if a criminal breaks the laws outside the state's
physical boundaries 3 The territorial rationale for assigning jurisdiction
derives from the state's interest in controlling conduct
and maintaining the
14
peace and dignity of conduct within the state.
Applying the territorial principle of criminal jurisdiction to a specific
crime requires that a court determine exactly where the crime occurred."

Many crimes, however, consist of several elements, the commission of which
may have occurred in several states.' 6 For example, a defendant may fatally7
wound his victim in one state, but the victim may die in another state.'
The murder appears to have occurred partially in both states, with neither
state having a complete murder to prosecute. 8 Many courts have adapted

the common-law territorial approach to complex crimes such as murder by
selecting a particular element of the crime that represents the gist of the
11. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing territorial principle at common
law).
12. Id.
13. See id.(discussing common-law territorial principle of jurisdiction). But see infra
notes 82-117 and accompanying text (noting that some state courts and legislatures have
recognized nonterritorial bases for criminal jurisdiction).
14. See Levitt, supra note 4, at 325-29 (discussing historical and metaphysical bases for
territorial jurisdiction); supra note 10 (noting historical foundations for territorial principle).
15. See Berge, supra note 4, at 242 (noting that application of territorial principle requires
that each crime occur in definite place); Levitt, supra note 4, at 325 (same); Perkins, supra
note 4, at 1157, 1159 (same); Note, supra note 7, at 1434 (same).
16. See Note, supra note 7, at 1434 n. 23 (listing complex crimes that frustrate application
of territorial principle of jurisdiction). Embezzlement is an example of a crime that is difficult
to locate in one place. Id. Often a criminal in one place will induce a victim in a different
place to send money to the embezzler. Id. When the embezzler spreads the embezzlement
between two places, the law considers the embezzlement to have occurred in the victim's
location, where the embezzler breached the victim's trust. Id.
17. See 4 BLACKSTONE, CoENmARIES *303 (noting problem confronting grand jurors
when crime occurred in more than one state). A murder, the elements of which occurred in
two states, was the jurisdictional problem that presented the initial impetus for expanding the
territorial principle. Id. The jury in the state where the fatal blow occurred had no body to
examine to see if a death occurred, and the jury in the state where the body lay had no
evidence of the fatal blow. Id. Therefore, neither state could prosecute the offender. Id.; see
Perkins, supra note 4, at 1157 (discussing jurisdiction over murder that occurred in two states).
18. See supra notes 16-17 (discussing jurisdiction over murder when murder occurred in
two separate states). The most famous case in which strict application of the territorial theory
worked an injustice occurred in North Carolina and Tennessee. State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909,
19 S.E. 602 (1894); State v. Hall, 115 N.C. 811, 20 S.E. 729 (1894). The defendant, while
standing in North Carolina, fired his gun and killed the victim, who was over the state line
in Tennessee. State v. Hall, 114 N.C. at
-, 19 S.E. at 602. North Carolina attempted to
prosecute the defendant first, but the conviction was reversed because the fatal force had its
effect in Tennessee. Id. at -,
19 S.E. at 604. Tennessee then attempted to prosecute the
defendant. State v. Hall, 115 N.C. at 811, 20 S.E. at 729. Because the defendant was in North
Carolina, however, and never entered Tennessee, Tennessee could not seek extradition of the
defendant from North Carolina. Id. at -,
20 S.E. at 730. Under the extradition statute a
defendant must be a fugitive from the demanding state for valid extradition. Id.
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The gist of the offense, also referred to as the gravamen of the

offense, is the most important element of the crime.20 Under the commonlaw territorial approach to jurisdiction, the place where the gist of the
offense occurred determines jurisdiction.2 Although this technique for determining jurisdiction is often arbitrary because it forces the court to
designate one element of the offense as the most important, commentators
have praised the rule for its clarity and ease of application. 22

19. See Perkins, supra note 4, at 1158 (discussing gist of offense principle); Note, supra
note 7, at 1432, 1434 (same). Some common offenses that courts have reduced to one element
for jurisdictional purposes include robbery, which courts have deemed to occur where the thief
takes the property. Note, supra note 7, at 1434 n. 23. Embezzlement occurs where defendant
breaches trust, bigamy occurs where the second marriage takes place, and libel occurs at the
place of circulation rather than publication of the libelous material. Id.
To solve the jurisdictional problem that complex crimes such as embezzlement present to
the courts, many states have enacted legislation that codifies the common-law territorial
principles of jurisdiction, but which also provides the courts with greater flexibility to apply
the rule to some of the recognized trouble situations. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 at 3940 (1985) (discussing and listing state criminal jurisdiction statutes); Axuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
13-108 (1978) (codifying territorial principle of jurisdiction); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.060

(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (same); see also Berge, supra note 4, at 248-59 (discussing modem
criminal jurisdiction statutes); Note, supra note 7, at 1436-39 (same).
20. See supra note 19(discussing gist of offense approach to territorial jurisdiction).
21. Id.
22. See Note, supra note 7, at 1435 (noting that territorial principle is clear rule).
Although the territorial rule appears clear, when courts apply the rule they frequently use a
number of legal fictions to adapt the rule to different situations. See Berge, supra note 4, at
248-59 (discussing legal fictions associated with territorial jurisdiction); Levitt, supra note 4,
at 333 (same); Note, supra note 7, at 1435 (same); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03, at 39
n.9 (1985) (discussing extension of strict territorial rule through legal fictions); 21 Am. JuR.
2D Criminal Law §§ 344.53 (1981 & Supp. 1987) (noting exceptions to territorial rule); 22
C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 134 (1961 & Supp. 1987) (same). The most common legal fictions that
courts use in jurisdictional questions are constructive presence and continuing offense. The
theory of constructive presence provides that a defendant need not be physically present within
a state if his actions set in motion a force that has an effect within the state. See Grayson v.
United States, 272 F. 553, 557 (6th Cir.) (holding that defendant was constructively present
within state when he caused liquor illegally to enter state by placing liquor on train going to
state), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 637 (1921). The continuing offense theory, which courts frequently
apply to the crime of conspiracy, provides that an offense does not end when the defendants
complete all the elements, but rather the offense continues with each additional act by the
defendant. See Lucas v. United States, 275 F. 405, 406 (8th Cir. 1921) (holding that conspiracy
continues in any state in which defendants act to execute their plan), cert. denied, 258 U.S.
620 (1922). Some courts have been very creative in their attempts to make a crime fit the
territorial theory. See State v. Devot, 66 Utah '319, -, 242 P. 395, 397 (1925) (holding
that innocent party to fraudulent scheme was agent of defendant for purposes of providing
state with jurisdiction). In State v. Devot the defendant, while in California, fraudulently
induced a victim in Utah to wire money to the defendant in California. Id. The Supreme
Court of Utah held that the telegraph agent, who received the money from the victim in Utah,
was the agent of the defendant and delivery of the money to the agent was delivery to the
defendant. Id. Therefore, although the defendant had never been in Utah, the court deemed
him to have received the money in Utah and held that the fraud took place in Utah. Id.
Some commentators criticize the use of legal fictions to extend the application of the
territorial rule because the use of fictions places too much discretion in the hands of the court.
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Despite the apparent clarity and simplicity of the territorial approach,
however, the territorial approach does not solve the question of jurisdiction
over an interstate telephonic conspiracy. 23 The gist of a criminal conspiracy
is the agreement.- The agreement in an interstate telephonic conspiracy,
however, does not occur in a discernible place, but rather in the telephone
wires between the two conspirators. Therefore, to apply the territorial
principle to interstate telephone conspiracies, courts must attach jurisdictional significance to an element of the conspiracy other than the agreement.? A common-law conspiracy has no element other than the agreement
to engage in unlawful activity. 26 Many states, however, have added to the
definition of conspiracy the requirement that one or more of the conspirators
perform an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 27 The overt act
element of statutory conspiracy conceivably could provide courts with an
element other than the agreement with which to establish jurisdiction over
28
interstate telephonic conspiracies consistently with territorial principles.

See Berge, supra note 4, at 242 (criticizing extensive use of legal fiction in area of criminal
jurisdiction); Levitt, supra note 4, at 333 (same); Note, supra note 7, at 1443 (same).
Additionally, critics claim that legal fictions mask the general insufficiency of the territorial
approach to criminal jurisdiction. See Berge, supra note 4, at 242 (criticizing extensive use of
legal fiction in area of criminal jurisdiction); Levitt, supra note 4, at 333 (same); Note, supra
note 7, at 1443 (same).
23. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (noting that common-law territorial
principles do not solve jurisdictional problem of interstate telephonic conspiracies).
24. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting that in criminal conspiracy agreement
is gist of offense).
25. See infra notes 27-38 and accompanying text (discussing courts' use of overt act
element to determine jurisdiction of conspiracies when location of agreement is unknown or
unclear).
26. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 357-59 (1912) (noting that common-law
conspiracy is complete when conspirators form agreement); LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 6.4(d)
(noting that common-law criminal conspiracy is complete upon agreement among conspirators);
WHARTON'S CRnmHAL. LAW, supra note 1, § 721 (same); Developments in the Law, Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. J. 920, 945-46 (1959) (same); 16 AM. JuR. 2D Conspiracy §§ 1-2
(1979 & supp. 1987) (same); 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy §§ 34-35 (1967 & Supp. 1987) (same); see
also supra note 5 (noting that gist of conspiracy is unlawful agreement). See generally G.
WILLIAMs, CRIMINAl LAW: Tim GENERAL PART 663-713 (2d ed. 1961) (discussing conspiracy);
Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 Gao. L. J. 328 (1947) (same). In common-law conspiracy
the agreement to engage in crime is the actus reus, and the intent to engage in crime is the
mens rea. LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 6.4(d).
27. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-4-3(a) (1982) (requiring overt act for criminal conspiracy);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-707(2) (1977) (same); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-2-201(2) (1986) (same);
see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(5) (1985) (requiring overt act in furtherance of conspiracy
unless object of conspiracy is first or second degree felony); WHARTON'S CUMNAL LAW, supra
note 1, § 728 (discussing overt act requirement); Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at
945-49 (discussing overt act requirements in conspiracy statutes). Like many state statutes, the
federal conspiracy statute requires an overt act for an indictable conspiracy. Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912) (noting that agreement is foundation of offense, but overt
act completes offense).
28. See infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text (discussing courts' use of overt act as
element on which to base jurisdiction of conspiracies when location of agreement is unknown).
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Current case law suggests that, in states with and without overt act
requirements, courts have used the commission of an overt act to resolve
29
the jurisdictional question that interstate telephonic conspiracies present.
The common law regards an overt act that any one of the members of a
conspiracy committed as an act that all of the members of the conspiracy
committed. 0 Moreover, courts consider the overt act to be a renewal of the
agreement itself. 3a Therefore, if one of the conspirators within a state
committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, a court will regard
all of the conspirators as having repeated the entire conspiratorial agreement
in the same state. 32 Accordingly, any state in which a conspirator acts in
furtherance of a conspiracy has jurisdiction over the conspiracy. 33 A court
in the state where a conspirator has acted need not determine the location
of the original conspiratorial agreement itself.3 4 Additionally, because the
vicarious liability of coconspirators is a common-law principle that exists
independently of any statutory overt act requirement, any state may use the
overt act analysis to determine jurisdiction consistently with territorial
principles. 35 Even if an overt act is not part of a particular state's definition
of conspiracy, an overt act within the state gives the state jurisdiction over
the conspiracy through the principle of vicarious liability.3 6 If, however, the

29. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 418 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1980) (noting that entry of
defendants into state was overt act in furtherance of conspiracy that defendants formed outside
state, and thus, state had jurisdiction over conspiracy); State v. Overton, 60 N.C. App. 1, 36,
298 S.E.2d 695, 716 (1982) (holding that court had jurisdiction over conspiracy when overt
act occurred in state, regardless of where conspirators formed agreement); State v. Davis, 203
N.C. 13, 32, 164 S.E. 737, 747 (noting that court has jurisdiction over conspiracy if conspirators
formed agreement in state, or if act in furtherance of conspiracy occurred in state), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 649 (1932).
30. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1947) (noting that conspirators
are vicariously liable for acts of their coconspirators); Bannon v. United States, 156 U.S. 464,
468-69 (1895) (same); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 at 49-50 (same); LAFAvE, supra note 1, §
6.5(c) (same); 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy §§ 73-74 (1961 & Supp. 1987) (same).
31. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing principle that each conspirator
is responsible for acts of coconspirators).
32. See id. (discussing principle of vicarious liability of coconspirators).
33. See Rivera v. United States, 57 F.2d 816, 819 (1st Cir. 1932) (noting that location
of conspiracy is immaterial provided overt act occurs within court's jurisdiction); State v.
Davis, 203 N.C. 13, 32, 164 S.E. 737, 747 (noting that state in which acts or agreement occur
has jurisdiction over conspiracy), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 649 (1932); see also 16 AM. Juar. 2D
Conspiracy § 21 (1981 & Supp. 1987) (noting that jurisdiction will lie where acts occur
regardless of where conspirator formed agreement); 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 83 (1961 & Supp.
1987) (same); 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 136(i) (1967 & Supp. 1987) (same).
34. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (state where conspirator acts has jurisdiction
over conspiracy even if location of agreement is unknown).
35. See LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 6.5 (noting that coconspirators are vicariously liable
for all acts that each conspirator commits in furtherance of conspiracy).
36. See United States v. Mayo, 721 F.2d 1084, 1089 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that overt
act within state boundaries grants jurisdiction to prosecute conspiracy regardless of whether
conspiracy statute requires overt act); United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir.
1979) (noting that, although conspiracy statute requires overt act, proof that overt act occurred
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state conspiracy statute does require an overt act, the commission of the
act outside the state does not deprive the state of jurisdiction over the
conspiracy, provided the conspirators formed the initial agreement within
the state.3 Thus, by focusing on the location of an overt act, courts may
assert jurisdiction over a conspiracy consistently with territorial principles
if the agreement occurs within the state, or, if the location of the agreement
is unknown, if an overt act in furtherance of the agreement occurs within
the state.

8

Although courts use the commission of an overt act to aid in establishing
jurisdiction over conspiracies when the location of the agreement is unclear
or unknown, the validity of this technique is questionable.3 9 If courts are
going to attribute jurisdictional significance to the overt act requirement,
the overt act should be a substantively important part of the crime of
conspiracy. Whether the additional overt act requirement has substantive
significance to the crime of conspiracy, however, never has been clear. 4°

within state is not required for assertion of jurisdiction); State v. Pooler, 141 Me. 274,
, 43 A.2d 353, 358 (1945) (noting that prosecution may occur where acts in furtherance
of conspiracy occur, regardless of whether statute requires overt act).
43 A.2d 353, 358 (1945) (holding that state
37. See State v. Pooler, 141 Me. 274, -,
where conspirators form conspiracy has jurisdiction, even if required overt act element occurs
outside state).
38. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text (discussing courts' use of overt act
element to establish jurisdiction over conspiracies).
39. See infra notes 40-55 and accompanying text (discussing validity of use of overt act
to determine jurisdiction).
40. See Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 964 (noting that intent of legislatures
in including overt act requirement is subject of debate among courts and legal scholars). The
formation of an agreement is an event that rarely produces physical evidence. Id. Usually,
prosecutors can prove the existence of a conspiracy only by demonstrating that the conspirators'
actions imply a previous agreement. Id. Because prosecutors usually must prove a conspiratorial
agreement by inference rather than by direct evidence, many prosecutors included proof of an
overt act in their cases before grand juries. Id. Thus, the statutory overt act requirement
merely may have reflected the prosecutor's practices at the time that the legislators drafted
the conspiracy statute. Id. Dicta in an early United States Supreme Court opinion suggested
that the overt act merely was a locus penitentiae that gave the conspirators an opportunity
for withdrawing from the conspiracy before their criminal liability attached. United States v.
Britton, 108 U.S. 199, 204 (1883). In a later case, the United States Supreme Court interpreted
the overt act requirement as an element of the offense that consummates the guilt of the
conspirators, and also provides a ready method for determining proper venue for conspiracy
trials. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE §
5.03 at 452-53 (discussing function of overt act requirement); LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 6.5(c)

(same).
Courts agree that the overt act need not be criminal. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298, 333-34 (1957) (noting that overt act in furtherance of conspiracy need not be criminal
act); Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942) (same); Developments in the Law,
supra note 26, at 946 (noting that overt act need not be criminal, and may be very insignificant).
The commission of one overt act is sufficient to complete the conspiracy for all the conspirators.
Bannon v. United States, 156 U.S. 464 (1895). Some state statutes require the act to be a
substantial step towards the object of the conspiracy. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 151(4) (1983) (requiring substantial step toward contemplated crime); Orno REv. CODE
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Some courts have interpreted the overt act as an additional substantive
element of the offense that is necessary to hold the conspirators culpable,
while other courts have considered the overt act merely as proof of the
existence of a criminal agreement. 41 In the most recent United States Supreme
Court decision on the issue, the Court interpreted the overt act requirement
as an element of proof that merely demonstrates the conspiratorial agreement, rather than a separate element of the crime that is necessary for
criminal culpability. 42 Despite the Supreme Court's decision, however, some
commentators argue that an overt act requirement manifests the state
legislatures' opinion that the common-law crime of conspiracy, which consists only of an agreement, is no longer a sufficient basis for criminal
prosecution.4 3 Because the courts and legislatures have not resolved the
criminal significance of the overt act requirement, the overt act should not
be a jurisdictionally significant element of the crime of conspiracy.
Although the state courts' use of the overt act requirement to establish

jurisdiction is questionable because the approach attaches jurisdictional
significance to a relatively insignificant act, the state courts appear to have
adopted the approach from the federal court system." The United States
Supreme Court explicitly has encouraged the use of overt acts to determine
the location for federal conspiracy trials.4 5 In the federal system, however,
ANN. § 2923.01(B) (Baldwin 1986) (same); VASH. REv. CODE § 9A.28.040(1) (1988) (same);
see also LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 6.5(c) (noting that some states require overt act to be
substantial step toward completion of planned crime).
41. See Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 947 (discussing overt act element as
element of proof). The majority and dissenting opinions of the United States Supreme Court
in Hyde v. United States reflect the two sides to the debate over the function of the overt act
requirement. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 357-60 (1912); id. at 387-91 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). The majority in Hyde v. United States reasoned that the overt act was necessary
for and completed the offense. Id. at 359. Therefore, according to the majority, the overt act
was more than evidence of the conspiratorial agreement; the overt act consummated the
conspiracy. Id. Justice Holmes dissented from the view of the majority and reasoned that the
overt act is simply evidence that the conspiracy has "passed beyond words." Id. at 389.
According to the Holmes dissent, the act is no more a part of the crime than is the existence
of an unexpired statute of limitations. Id.
42. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957).
43. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 at 39, § 5.03 at 452-53 (1985) (discussing view that
overt act requirement reflects legislatures' opinion that agreement alone is not enough to
warrant penal sanctions); LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 6.5(c) (same); Developments in the Law,
supra note 26, at 948 (same); see also People v. George, 74 Cal. App. 440, -,
241 P. 97,
104 (1925) (noting that agreement alone is not enough to warrant prosecution).
44. See State v. Pooler, 141 Me. 247, -,
43 A.2d 353, 358 (1945) (citing federal
cases in support of state assertion of jurisdiction on basis of overt act); State v. Davis, 203
N.C. 13, 32, 164 S.E. 737, 747 (same), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 649 (1932); State v. Harrington,
128 Vt. 242, _, 260 A.2d 692, 698 (1969) (noting that federal method of locating trials
wherever overt act occurs should apply to state jurisdiction); Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242, 245
(,Vyo.) (noting that state courts have applied federal venue principles to state jurisdictional
issues), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 108 (1987); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 26,
at 978 (noting that state jurisdiction principles parallel federal venue principles).
45. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 361-62 (1912) (noting that courts can use
overt act element of conspiracy to establish venue when location of agreement is unclear or
unknown).
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courts use the overt act to decide proper venue for a trial, rather than
jurisdiction over an offense.4 The concepts of venue and jurisdiction are
fundamentally different. 47 When a federal court attempts to decide in which

state a crime occurred, the court is not deciding whether it has the authority
to hear the case, but rather which court in the federal system is the

appropriate forum for resolving the case. 4 The proper venue for a trial is
largely a procedural issue, in which the primary concerns are the convenience
of the forum for the government and the defendant. 49 Therefore, the federal
court may be warranted in using an insignificant action by a conspirator as
50
a convenient, perhaps arbitrary means of deciding the forum for the trial.

46. See Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242, 245 (Wyo.) (noting that sixth amendment to United
States Constitution applies to federal venue provisions, rather than jurisdictional provisions),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 108 (1987).
47. See Lane v. State, 388 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. 1980) (noting that courts must not
confuse venue and jurisdiction, and that venue cases are inapplicable to jurisdiction cases);
State v. Baldwin, 305 A.2d 555, 558 (Me. 1973) (noting that a vast difference exists between
policy considerations governing venue and jurisdiction); George, supra note 7, at 610 (distinguishing venue and jurisdiction); Levitt, supra note 4, at 330 (same); 21 AM. JuR. 2D Criminal
Law § 336 (1981 & Supp. 1987) (same).
48. See 21 A. Jua. 2D Criminal Law § 361 (1981 & Supp. 1987) (discussing difference
between venue and jurisdiction).
49. See United States v. Mayo, 721 F.2d 1084, 1091 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
defendant's arrival in district was overt act that established proper venue). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Mayo noted that determining
venue on the basis of mere overt acts might provide the federal government with dangerous
power to locate trials in districts that are unfair to the defendant. Id. The court noted,
however, that many criminals would escape prosecution entirely if the government could locate
trials only where conspirators formed the agreement. Id. The Mayo court concluded, therefore,
that courts must base their assertion of venue in conspiracy cases on overt acts because
otherwise defendants might escape prosecution completely. Id.; see 21 AM. JuR. 2D Criminal
Law § 361 (1981 & Supp. 1987) (noting that venue is largely procedural question). The concern
that conspiracy defendants might escape prosecution entirely is not a valid one for states,
however, because one state's refusal to assume jurisdiction does not affect another state's
ability to assert jurisdiction. See LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 2.9(d) (noting that, under the
separate sovereign principle, double jeopardy does not attach to criminal trials for the same
act in different states).
50. See Hyde v. United -States, 225 U.S. 347, 363 (1912) (noting that use of overt act
to determine venue is solution to problem of conspiracy formed in unknown place); United
States v. Strickland, 493 F.2d 182, 187 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that telephone calls into district
are overt acts sufficient to sustain venue in that district). A federal statute provides that, for
any offense which defendants perpetrate through use of the mails or transportation in interstate
commerce, venue is proper in any district from, through, or into which the commerce or mail
moves. 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1985). Courts have applied the statute to crimes involving interstate
telephone calls. See United States v. Spiro, 385 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1967) (citing cases in
which courts have applied federal statute to telephone calls). Therefore, the United States
could prosecute an interstate telephonic conspiracy in either the district in which the call
originated, or the district in which the call was received. See State v. Whitaker, 372 F. Supp.
154, 158 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (holding that venue of trial for conspiracy to operate illegal gambling
business could be in district where each defendant had placed or received calls), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1113 (1975).
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In contrast with the federal venue question, however, the question of
a state court's jurisdiction over a conspiracy is substantive." In deciding
whether a state court has jurisdiction over a crime, the court is deciding
whether it has an interest in prosecuting the crime. 2 If the only act that
occurred wholly within the state is a relatively insignificant and often
completely legal overt act by a conspirator, the state's interest in punishing
that act is minimal..3 On the other hand, a conspiracy may pose grave
danger to a state in which no overt act occurred.14 Therefore, the location
of the overt act does not necessarily determine which state or states are
threatened by the conspiracy, and so the territorial principle is not a rational
55
means of determining jurisdiction over conspiracies.
Although the overt act approach to interstate telephonic
conspiracies may be inappropriate in the context of state trials, the approach
provides courts with a pragmatic solution to jurisdictional problems.5 6 Courts
can resolve the question of jurisdiction over interstate telephonic conspiracies
consistently with the territorial principles of the common law by applying
the overt act analysis.5 7 Additionally, the overt act rule is easy to apply,
provided a conspirator committed an overt act. 58 Although pragmatic, the
territorial approach is limited to protecting a state's interest in preserving
the peace and dignity of life within the state's boundaries and, therefore,
disregards other interests that a state has in prosecuting conspiracies 9

51. See 21 Am. Jur. 2D Criminal Law § 361 (1981 & Supp. 1987) (discussing state
jurisdictional concerns).
52. See Lane v. State, 388 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. 1980) (noting that jurisdiction is
power of state to exert influence of its courts over defendant); George, supra note 7, at 611
(discussing common tendency of courts to confuse concepts of venue and jurisdiction).
53. See Carter v. State, 418 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1980) (holding that mere act of returning
to state was overt act sufficient to confer jurisdiction on state court); see also Developments
in the Law, supra note 26, at 978 (noting that state in which act occurs may have minimal
interest in prosecuting conspiracy).
54. See Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 978 (conspiracy may endanger state
although no act occurs within state); cf. Note, supra note 7, at 1441 (analyzing jurisdiction
over felony murder and noting that location of crime does not necessarily correspond with
state's interest in prosecuting crime).
55. See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text (noting that courts' use of overt act
element of conspiracy to establish jurisdiction when location of agreement is unknown does
not serve states' inteiests in prosecuting conspiracies).
56. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (noting that overt act approach to
jurisdiction is pragmatic).
57. See supra notes 29-38 (discussing courts' use of overt act analysis to determine
jurisdiction over interstate conspiracies consistently with common-law territorial principle).
58. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 361 (1912) (noting that, by pinning
jurisdiction on overt act, courts eliminate issue of where conspiratorial agreement took place).
But see supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing courts' use of legal fictions to make
territorial principle fit crimes).
59. See George, supra note 7, at 626 (noting that territorial principle insufficiently
addresses state's interests and needs reform); Levitt, supra note 4, at 333-35 (noting that
mechanical application of territorial principle may disregard legitimate state interests); Note,
supra note 7, at 1443 (noting that limiting jurisdiction to serve only territorial interests is
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Ideally, a state's exercise of jurisdiction should serve all of the state's
interests in prosecuting conspiracies. 6°
A state has two broad goals in asserting jurisdiction over and prosecuting
crimes. 61 First, a state has an interest in controlling the conduct of the
people within its boundaries, and thus, maintaining the peace and dignity
within the state. 62 Second, the state has an interest in protecting itself and
its citizens from threatened harm from any source. 63 A criminal conspiracy
may threaten both of the state's interests. 64 First, a conspiracy injures the
peace within a state as soon as the conspiracy forms. 65 A state has an
interest in preventing people from conspiring within its boundaries, just as
a state has an interest in preventing people from fighting within its boundaries. 66 When conspirators form a conspiracy within a state, the conspiracy
has violated the need of the state to control the conduct of the people
within the state, and thus, to keep the peace within the state. 67 As evidence
logically spurious). If courts apply the territorial approach to jurisdiction to interstate telephonic
conspiracies, states that do not require proof of an overt act to prove a conspiracy would be
in the anomalous position of imposing a higher burden of proof for a state to assert jurisdiction
than is necessary to prove the crime itself. See United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 212
(5th Cir. 1979) (noting that prosecutor need not prove that overt acts took place within state's
boundaries, because conspiracy statute does not require overt act and, thus, court cannot
require more proof for jurisdiction than for crime).
60. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03, at 35, 40 (1985) (noting that jurisdiction should
reflect interests of sovereign asserting jurisdiction, and therefore, the Model Penal Code
contains nonterritorial bases for jurisdiction to prevent danger of injustice); Berge, supra note
4, at 243, 269 (noting that courts must adopt realistic view of modern crimes, and that courts
should recognize frankly extraterritorial elements of state interests without resort to legal
fiction); Note, supra note 7, at 1441-44 (noting that jurisdiction must reflect all interests of
state, and that any state with legitimate interest in prosecuting crime should be able to assert
jurisdiction over crime); see also Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York in
SELECTED EssAYs ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 690, 699-701 (1963) (noting that, if pragmatism
were only concern in determining jurisdiction, all homicide trials would take place in Alaska);
Note, supra note 7, at 1439-40 (noting that pragmatism alone is not sufficient reason to justify
states' assertion of criminal jurisdiction over crime).
61. See Note, supra note 7, at 1448 (noting that interests of states in prosecuting crime
are to control peace within state and to protect state and its citizens from harm); infra notes
62-63 and accompanying text (describing two state interests in prosecuting crime).
62. See Perkins, supra note 4, at 1155 (noting that state has interest in controlling peace
and dignity within state); Note, supra note 7, at 1447 (same).
63. See Note, supra note 7, at 1448 (noting that interests of states in prosecuting crime
are to control peace within state and to protect state and its citizens from harm).
64. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975) (noting that conspiracy poses
threat of group activity and of more successful criminal enterprises); MODEL PENAL CODE §
5.03, at 387 (1985) (noting that criminal conspiracy is crime for two reasons); infra notes 6572 and accompanying text (discussing two harms that conspiracy poses to states).
65. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 (1975) (noting that conspiracy is
harmful in itself, independently of threat that substantive offense poses); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 573 (1951) (same); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448 (1949)
(same); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915) (same).
66. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing danger to peace that conspiracy
poses to state in which conspirators form agreement).
67. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing need of state to control conduct
within state boundaries).
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of the inherent threat that the crime of conspiracy poses to states, some
state statutes provide that a defendant's incapacity to commit the substantive
offense that is the object of the conspiracy is not a defense to the conspiracy
itself. 6
In addition to violating the peace of a state, the formation of a
conspiratorial agreement also threatens the state's second goal of protecting
itself and its citizens from harm. 69 A group of people that combine their
talents and resources toward an illegal end pose a greater societal threat
than an individual who plans illegal acts.70 The cumulative effort of a group
increases the likelihood of ultimate criminal success. 71 Therefore, the prosecution of the crime of conspiracy is necessary not only to preserve the
peace within the state but also to protect a state and its citizens from the
increased danger of a successful criminal enterprise in the future.72
The traditional common-law territorial principle of jurisdiction protects
the interest of a state in maintaining peace within the state, but does not
protect the state's additional interest in protecting itself from the future
harmful effects of extrastate conspiracies.73 A state has an interest in
protecting itself from harm, regardless of where the criminals initiate the
harm.74 If the goal of a conspiracy formed in Maine is to burglarize a house
in California, California has an interest in prosecuting the conspiracy
because the conspiracy threatens harm to California and its citizens. 7" The
location of the conspiratorial agreement is irrelevant to the protective interest
of a state in prosecuting the conspiracy to prevent future harm to the state
or its citizens. The relevant consideration is the criminal objective that the
conspirators formed the conspiracy to achieve.7 6 Thus, in most cases the

68. See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915) (noting that lack of
capacity to commit crime which is goal of conspiracy is not defense to conspiracy); State v.
Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, -,
244 A.2d 499, 502 (same), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968). See
generally Annotation, Impossibility of Consummation of Substantive Crime as Defense in
CriminalProsecutionfor Conspiracy or Attempt to Commit Crime, 37 A.L.R.3D 375 (1971).
69. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961) (noting that conspiracy
threatens state by increasing likelihood that crime which is object of conspiracy will be
successful); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing state interest in protecting
itself and its citizens from harm).
70. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting that conspiracy threatens states'
protective interests).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (noting that territorial principle does
not allow state to protect itself from threatened harm that extrastate conspiracies pose).
74. See Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727, 746, 521 A.2d 1216, 1225 (1987) (holding
that state may punish defendant for obstruction of justice even though defendant's acts
occurred completely outside state).
75. But see infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text (noting that state's interest in
protecting individual citizens may be less compelling than state's interest in protecting citizens
generally).
76. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (noting that act which occurs
outside state and produces harmful effects in state justifies state in punishing actors).
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traditional common-law approach to jurisdiction
only partially serves the
77
states' interests in prosecuting conspiracies.
In the case of interstate telephonic conspiracies, the traditional territorial
approach to jurisdiction does not serve either of a state's interests. 7 The
first rationale for prosecuting conspiracy is that the initial formation of the
conspiracy is disruptive of the peace within the state where the conspiracy
formed. 79 Under normal circumstances, the formation of a conspiracy is
like an explosion that disrupts the peace of the place where the conspirators
join together and conspire. 0 When a conspiratorial agreement occurs in the
telephone wires between two states, however, theoretically the disruptive
collusion occurs in the wires above the states, rather than wholly within
either state. Although each state subsequently may suffer the ill effects of
the explosion, the explosion itself did not disrupt the peace within any state.
Because a conspiracy that is not formed in any particular state does not
disrupt the peace within either state, neither state should be able to assert
jurisdiction over an interstate telephonic conspiracy on purely territorial
grounds. Furthermore, unless the conspirators commit an overt act within
the state that is the target of the conspiracy, the territorial principle of
jurisdiction does not allow the target state to protect itself by prosecuting
the conspiracy. 8' Therefore, the territorial approach to jurisdiction is completely insufficient to serve either interest that states have in prosecuting
interstate telephonic conspiracies.
To be most effective in serving all of a state's interests, courts should
develop a nonterritorial basis for jurisdiction over conspiracies that allows
the states to protect themselves from all harm.12 Some courts have recognized
the validity of a nonterritorial protective theory of criminal jurisdiction in
certain situations. 3 These courts have realized that, for some crimes, the
harm that threatens a state does not necessarily correspond to the place
where the crime occurred.8 4 These courts apply a protective rather than

77. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (noting that territorial principle of
jurisdiction does not serve all of states' interests in prosecuting conspiracies).
78. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (noting that territorial approach to
jurisdiction over interstate telephonic conspiracies does not serve any interest that states have
in prosecuting conspiracies).
79. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (noting that first interest of state in
prosecuting conspiracies is to protect peace within state).
80. See id. (discussing interests of state in preventing conspiracies from disrupting peace
within state's borders).
81. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text (noting courts' use of overt act to
establish jurisdiction over conspiracies when location of agreement is unknown).
82. See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text (introducing protective theory of criminal
jurisdiction).
83. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (holding that state has power to
punish defendant for acts occurring outside state that produce harmful effects within state);
Commonwealth v. Carroll, 360 Mass. 580, -,
276 N.E.2d 705, 709 (1971) (same); Traveler's
Health Ass'n V. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 877, 892, 51 S.E.2d 263, 268-69 (1949) (same),
aff'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
84. See supra note 83 (noting that some courts have applied nonterritorial principles of
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territorial theory of jurisdiction, under which the relevant jurisdictional
consideration is the location of the harmful effects of the crime. 5 Thus, a
state may prosecute a defendant who never has been in the state, if the
defendant's actions outside the state threaten harm to the state or its
citizens.8 6 The United States Supreme Court recognized the protective basis
for asserting jurisdiction in Strassheim v. Daily."' In Strassheim a grand
jury in Michigan indicted the defendant for bribery and obtaining money
from the state under false pretenses. 8 While in Illinois, the defendant had
arranged with a state official in Michigan fraudulently to sell used machinery
to the state under a contract that called for new machinery.9 The governor
of Illinois took the defendant into custody in Illinois for the defendant's
extradition to Michigan. 9° The defendant challenged his custody through a
habeas corpus petition which claimed in part that the defendant had
committed no crime under the laws of Michigan because he never had
committed any act in Michigan. 91 The Illinois district court granted the
defendant's petition, and the state of Michigan appealed the case to the
United States Supreme Court. 92 The Supreme Court noted initially that the
defendant personally had committed no act in Michigan in furtherance of
his scheme to defraud the state. 93 The Strassheim Court held, however, that
if the defendant had induced by fraud a payment by the state of Michigan,
Michigan had an interest in punishing the defendant. 94 The Court asserted
that a state's interest in punishing a defendant who committed criminal acts
outside the state's borders, but intended the acts to produce a detrimental
effect within the state's borders, is equally as strong as the state's interest
in punishing a defendant that was physically present at the place where the
criminal actions had their intended effect. 95
criminal jurisdiction to extrastate crimes); see also infra note 96 (listing state decisions applying
nonterritorial jurisdictional principles).
85. See Perkins, supra note 4, at 1155 (discussing protective principle of criminal
jurisdiction); Note, supra note 7, at 1451 (same).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85 (discussing nonterritorial principles of
jurisdiction); see also MODEL PE1NAL CODE § 1.03(1) (f) (1985) (providing for jurisdiction when
conduct outside state bears reasonable relation to legitimate state interest).
87. 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
88. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 281 (1911).
89. Id.at 282.
90. Id.at 281.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.at 284.
94. Id.
95. Id.at 285. Although courts have cited the Strassheim v.Daily decision in support
of asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes when the defendants intended that their
acts have detrimental effects within the state, the actual language that the Court used in
providing for nonterritorial jurisdiction was, "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended
to produce and producing detrimental effects within it." Id. (emphasis added). In the case of
an extrastate conspiracy, the defendants may not have completed the crime that was the object
of the conspiracy, and therefore, the acts of the defendants may not have produced any actual
detrimental effects within the state other than the threat of future harm.
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State courts frequently cite the Supreme Court's holding in Strassheim
to support a state's assertion of jurisdiction over crimes occurring outside
the state, but having harmful effects inside the state.96 For example, in
Pennington v. State 7 the Supreme Court of Maryland considered whether
it had jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant for obstruction of justice when
all of the defendant's acts occurred completely outside the state. 9 While in
the District of Columbia, the defendant had stabbed a woman to prevent
the woman from testifying in a Maryland assault case. 99 Maryland has no
criminal jurisdiction statute, and thus, common-law principles govern the
subject matter jurisdiction of offenses.'00 The Pennington court discussed
the territorial basis for criminal jurisdiction at common law, and noted that
the territorial principle required that each crime have a particular situs for
jurisdictional purposes.101 The court observed that, for crimes which are
defined in terms of an act, the situs of the crime is the place where the act
occurs.102 The court then referred to the Strassheim decision, and noted
further that some crimes are defined in terms of an effect or result, and
the situs for those crimes is the state in which the effect or result of the
criminal acts occurs. 0 3 The Pennington court concluded that the crime of
obstruction of justice is an effect-oriented crime. 1 4 The court determined
that, because the effect of the defendant's acts was to obstruct justice in
Maryland, jurisdiction lay in Maryland. 05 The protective principle of jurisdiction, which the Maryland court adopted for effect-oriented crimes, serves
a state's interest in protecting itself from harm, whether the harm initiates
inside or outside the state. 101 Accordingly, the protective principle allows a
state to prosecute crimes that have harmful effects in the state, but that
the state would not be able to prosecute under a strict common-law territorial
10 7
approach to jurisdiction.
Although the Pennington court limited its discussion to crimes that
threaten state governmental functioning, such as contempt and obstruction
of justice, the federal courts have used the same protective analysis to
96. See Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007, 1008 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (citing Strassheim
'v. Daily); Johnson v. Burke, 238 Ind. 1, 6, 148 N.E.2d 413, 416 (1958) (same); Commonwealth
v. Levin, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 482, 502, 417 N.E.2d 440, 451 (App.Ct. 1981) (same); State v.
Darroch, 305 N.C. 196, 202, 287 S.E.2d 856, 860 (same), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1138 (1982);
see also Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U. S. 280, 285 (1911) (noting that states may assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction over some crimes).
97. 308 Md. 727, 521 A.2d 1216 (1987).
98. Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727, , 521 A.2d 1216, 1216-25 (1987).
99. Id. at
100. Id. at

-,

101. Id. at
102. Id. at
103. Id. at

521 A.2d at 1216.
521 A.2d at 1217.

-,

,
,

521 A.2d at 1217-18.
521 A.2d at 1218-19.

-,

521 A.2d at 1219.

-,

521 A.2d at 1225.

104. Id.
105. Id. at

106. Id.
107. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (noting that, under territorial principle,
no state may assert jurisdiction over interstate telephonic conspiracies).
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protect not only the United States, but also its citizens. 0 For example, in
United States v. Bowman,109 the defendants, while on a ship at sea, had
formed a conspiracy to defraud a United States corporation."10 Not only
did the conspirators form the agreement outside the country, but all of the
overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred outside the territorial
limits of the United States."' Although the federal conspiracy statute did
not specifically provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over conspiracies
formed at sea, the United States Supreme Court held that, to give the
statutes their intended effect, courts must interpret the statute to include
extraterritorial conspiracies." 2 The Court reasoned that, for crimes such as
conspiracy to defraud the United States, the government's exercise of
jurisdiction cannot logically depend on the locality of the defendant's acts." 3
The Court recognized that conspirators are very likely to plan and execute
conspiracies from outside rather than inside the country."14 The Court noted
that a strict territorial approach to jurisdiction which required that acts
occur within the country for the federal government to assert jurisdiction
over a crime would not serve the purpose of the conspiracy statute, which
was to protect the United States from crime." 5 The Court added that to
prohibit the United States from asserting jurisdiction over offenses of the
type that logically and frequently would occur outside the territorial limits
of the United States would curtail the scope of criminal statutes and provide
immunity from prosecution for a large class of offenders." 6 Thus, the
Bowman Court held that, although the conspirators had perpetrated the
conspiracy entirely outside the country, and although the federal conspiracy
statute did not explicitly provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction, the United
States could employ a protective rationale to assert jurisdiction over a
7
conspiracy to defraud a United States corporation."1
Since the Bowman decision, the federal courts have applied the protective rationale of the Bowman court to many crimes other than conspiracy
to defraud a United States corporation, including conspiracy to distribute
drugs within the United States."' Although the Bowman Court was con-

108. See infra notes 109-119 and accompanying text (discussing use of protective principle
by federal courts to extend common-law jurisdiction over crimes).
109. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
110. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922).
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.at 98.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 671 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying protective
principle to drug smuggling offense), cert denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); United States v. Postal,
589 F.2d 862, 886 n. 39 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v.
Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); Rivard v.
United States, 375 F.2d 882, 886 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967). The
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cemed with federal assertion of jurisdiction, the protective argument that
the federal government uses to justify its assertion of jurisdiction over
extraterritorial conspiracies applies to the individual states. Just as the United
States needs to protect itself from conspiracies occurring at sea or abroad,
the states must be able to protect themselves and their citizens from threats
originating outside the states' boundaries." 9 Thus, even if conspirators
formed their agreement entirely outside a state, the state would have
justification to assert jurisdiction over a conspiracy to import drugs into
the state on the ground that the conspiracy statute would not serve its
protective purpose if the statute were not enforceable extraterritorially.
The Bowman decision is important to the question of interstate telephonic conspiracies not only because the Bowman Court recognized the
validity of nonterritorial jurisdiction, but also because the Court's opinion
implicitly suggested limits on the scope of nonterritorial jurisdiction. 20 The
Court in Bowman noted in dicta that courts may prosecute crimes committed
against private individuals or private property only when the crime occurred
within the boundaries of the state.'12 Thus, the Bowman opinion suggests
that courts may use only the territorial approach, and not the protective
approach, to jurisdiction over crimes committed against individuals.'2 Although the Bowman Court did not explain the basis for the distinction
between crimes against private individuals and crimes against a private
corporation, presumably the country's interest in protecting individual citizens is not as great as the country's interest in protecting its corporations
from fraud. The weaker interest in protecting individuals, therefore, is
insufficient to justify the country's assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the federal courts have been careful to classify conspiracies to
distribute drugs as offensive to the general welfare of the American people,
rather than offensive to individual citizens. 23 Analogously, the Bowman
opinion may preclude state courts from asserting nonterritorial jurisdiction
over an interstate telephonic conspiracy when the object of the conspiracy
is a crime against a private individual or his property.'2 Although states

federal courts also have applied the protective principle to the area of antitrust prosecution.
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting
that United States antitrust laws extend to activity affecting trade and commerce of United
States regardless of where activity took place).
119. See State v. Darroch, 305 N.C. 196, 205, 287 S.E.2d 856, 862 (noting that each
state may protect its own citizens in enjoyment of life, liberty, and property by punishing all
acts that, in contemplation of law, occur within the state), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1158 (1982).
120. See infra notes 121-25 (noting that protective principle may not be applicable to acts
that threaten individual citizens or their property).
121. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
122. Id.
123. See United States v. Brown, 549 F.2d 954, 957 (4th Cir.) (noting that substantial
and detrimental effect on health and general welfare of American people justifies United
States' assertion of jurisdiction over conspiracy to import narcotics), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
939 (1977).
124. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. In Battle v. State the Florida District Court of Appeals
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generally have not asserted jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes that
threaten only private individuals, no court explicitly has held that states do
not have the power to assert jurisdiction in such cases.' 25
The United States Constitution does not address directly the power of
the states or the federal government to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction
over crimes.126 Under the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution,
however, Congress has the power to make all laws necessary to execute
certain specific grants of power. 27 One commentator has argued, therefore,
that the federal constitution delegates to Congress the power to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes if the assertion of jurisdiction is
necessary to execute a specifically delegated power. 128 Because the tenth
amendment to the Constitution reserves to the states all powers that the
Constitution does not delegate expressly to the federal government, the

took a cautionary approach to nonterritorial jurisdiction in the case of an extraterritorial
solicitation charge. Battle v. State, 365 So. 2d 1035, 1036-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). In
Battle the defendant, while in New Jersey, solicited the murder of a man in Florida. Id. at
1036. The defendant performed no acts in Florida. Id. at 1037. The Battle court ruled that,
although the solicitation had as its object a murder in Florida, Florida had no ground to
assert jurisdiction because the defendant had performed no acts within the state. Id. The
holding of the Battle court is in accord with the principle that harmful acts which threaten
only individuals do not justify a state in asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction over a crime.
See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (noting that states may not apply protective
principle of jurisdiction to crimes against individuals). However, in Battle, Florida also had
attempted to charge the defendant with conspiracy to murder. Battle, 365 So. 2d at 1036.
Interestingly, the Florida court did not dismiss the conspiracy charge on jurisdictional grounds.
Id. at 1037. The Battle court did not make any distinction between the solicitation charge and
the conspiracy charge, but the court had noted earlier in the opinion that solicitation was a
complete crime when the defendant committed it in New Jersey. Id. The court apparently
found that the conspiracy continued into Florida as the hired killer traveled into Florida, and
that the continuing nature of conspiracy distinguished conspiracy from solicitation. Id. Therefore, the court held that jurisdiction over the conspiracy charge was valid. Id.; see MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.03, at 56 (1985) (noting that some states have enacted jurisdictional statutes
that allow state exercise of jurisdiction over acts occurring outside of state if actor's intent
was to cause any crime within state).
125. But see Berge, supra note 4, at 267 (arguing that protective principle of jurisdiction
should apply to crimes against individuals as well as crimes against state functions).
126. See George, supra note 7, at 614-15 (noting that federal constitution does not directly
address power of government or states to enact criminal code).
127. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
128. See George, supra note 7, at 615-16 (arguing that Congress has power to legislate
extraterritorially to execute delegated powers); see also Perkins, supra note 4, at 1172 (noting
that power of Congress to extend criminal jurisdiction beyond territorial principle is wellrecognized). In United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Co. the United States Supreme Court
suggested a different approach to the question of federal power to legislate extraterritorially.
United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936). The Court reasoned
that the powers inherent in sovereignty that England exercised in the American colonies vested
in the colonies collectively when the colonies separated from England. Id. at 316-18. Therefore,
the new United States had the same powers that any other nation had to legislate extraterritorially. Id. The Court's approach denies to the several states the powers inherent in sovereignty,
and one commentator has criticized the approach. See George, supra note 7, at 615 (criticizing
Court's opinion in United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Co.).
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states retain the powers inherent in sovereignty.1 29 These inherent sovereign
powers include the power to enact legislation that grants to state courts

extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes occurring outside the states' boundaries. 130 Thus, the Constitution does not prevent states from controlling

extraterritorial conduct by statute if the legislation does not conflict with
the federal power to regulate foreign affairs, does not reach a -federally
3
preempted area, or does not conflict with the interests of other states.1 '

Although the Constitution generally allows the states to assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
may be unconstitutional in specific instances if it conflicts with a defendant's
right to due process. 132 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment

to the Constitution, which applies to the states, safeguards a defendant's
right to a fundamentally fair trial.133 A trial in a state the location of which
impairs the defendant's ability to secure witnesses and otherwise prepare
for trial may violate the defendant's right to a fair trial under the fourteenth
amendment. 34 One criminal court has looked to the civil jurisdictional
principle of foreseeability and has concluded that a state cannot prosecute

129. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (noting that
states retain powers of sovereign); George, supra note 7, at 616-17 (arguing that states retain
powers inherent to sovereigns, including power to extend criminal jurisdiction beyond state
boundaries).
130. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (holding that states may extend
criminal jurisdiction beyond territorial limits to serve legitimate state interests). In Skiriotes
the state of Florida had enacted legislation making the removal of sponges from the Gulf of
Mexico illegal. Id. at 70-71. The defendant challenged the statute on the ground that the state
did not have the power under the Constitution to extend its criminal jurisdiction beyond the
territorial limits of the state. Id. at 71. The United States Supreme Court held that the state
of Florida retained the powers of a sovereign and, thus, could control the extraterritorial
conduct of its citizens. Id. at 77. The Court qualified its holding by noting that a state could
not enact legislation that conflicted with federal legislation. Id. at 79. The Skiriotes holding
specifically referred to the power of a state to control the conduct of its own citizens, but
logically a state criminal statute should be applicable to any offender. See id.; see also Wheat
v. State, 734 P.2d 1007, 1008 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (noting that power of states to rely on
nonterritorial bases for criminal jurisdiction is well-settled); State v. Darroch, 305 N.C. 196,
201-07, 287 S.E.2d 856, 860-61 (noting that many states assert jurisdiction on grounds other
than territorial principle), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1138 (1982); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03, at
54 (1985) (same).
131. See Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 79 (noting that states' assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction may not conflict with federal statutes); George, supra note 7, at 617 (noting limits on
state power to legislate extraterritorially).
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (providing that no state shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law); cf. E. Scorns & P. HAY, CoNFUCT
oF LAWS §§ 3.20-.35 (West 1982) (noting that fourteenth amendment due process right may
limit states' assertion of jurisdiction in civil cases).
133. See supra note 132 (noting that fourteenth amendment due process clause may limit
states' assertion of criminal jurisdiction).
134. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03, at 55 (noting that fourteenth amendment places
limits on state legislative jurisdiction); Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 978 (same);
supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that fourteenth amendment due process clause
may limit state's assertion of criminal jurisdiction).
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a defendant when the defendant could not foresee that his actions would
violate the laws of that state. 35 In State v. Palermo 36 the state of Kansas
charged the defendant with the sale of heroin. 3 7 The defendant lived in
Missouri and, through an accomplice, sold heroin to an informant in
Kansas. 38 Kansas tried the defendant for the illegal sale, although the
defendant never had been in Kansas. 3 9 The jury found the defendant guilty
of the illegal sale of narcotics, but after the trial, the defendant moved for
acquittal on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendant's crime. 14 The trial judge ruled for the defendant because the defendant
had not committed any criminal acts in the state, and the state appealed
the trial court's decision to the Supreme Court of Kansas. 41 The supreme
court affirmed the decision of the trial court, and dismissed the charges
against the defendant.1 42 The supreme court acknowledged that the defendant
was an "aider and abettor" under Kansas law and, therefore, the state
could try the defendant as if he were a principal offender. 43 The court also
restated the rule that the United States Supreme Court announced in
Strassheim v. Daily that a state may prosecute individuals for acts committed
outside a jurisdiction when the effect of the acts is the commission of a
crime within the jurisdiction.144 The Palermo court noted, however, that the
defendant had no intent to sell drugs in Kansas and did not know that his
accomplice would sell the drugs in Kansas. 45 The Palermo court concluded,
therefore, that a state may not assert jurisdiction over a defendant for a
crime occurring within the state if the defendant was not physically present
in the state, did not intend to commit a crime within the state, and could
not reasonably foresee that his act would cause, aid, or abet the commission
of a crime within the state. 46
Although the Palermo court did not phrase its holding in terms of the
defendant's due process rights, the holding presupposes that a defendant
has a right to trial only in a jurisdiction in which the defendant's criminal
liability was foreseeable. 47 In the case of conspiracy, however, a court may

135. See infra notes 136-46 and accompanying text (discussing one court's application of
civil principle of foreseeability to criminal jurisdiction).
136. 224 Kan. 275, , 579 P.2d 718, 719 (1978).
137. State v. Palermo, 224 Kan. 275, , 579 P.2d 718, 719 (1978).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at

-

, 579 P.2d at 720.

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1910)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See E. ScoLas, supra note 132, §§ 3.20-.35 (discussing due process rights of civil
defendants). Although civil choice of law principles are not applicable directly to criminal
cases, the federal constitution provides a defendant with due process rights that do not depend
on whether the defendant is subject to criminal or civil liability. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §

1496

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1475

assume that the conspirators who plan to commit the crime know where
the crime is to have its effect. Only a conspirator who joined the conspiracy
after the initial agreement and thus was unaware of the target location of
the conspiracy might be able to make a due process argument similar to
the defendant's argument in Palermo.14s Ordinarily, therefore, a conspiracy
defendant will not be able to argue convincingly that a trial in the state in

which the defendant planned his actions to have an effect would prejudice
the defendant's ability to prepare for trial.

49

Beyond the due process restrictions that the federal constitution places
on the power of the states to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over a crime,
the individual state constitutions may restrict states by providing explicitly

that criminal trials must take place in the jurisdiction where the criminal
actions took place.

50

A defendant does not have a federal constitutional

right to a state criminal trial only where the crime occurred.'5 The federal
constitution provides only the minimal requirements for defendant protection, however, and the states have the power to provide more protection to
defendants through state constitutional provisions.1 2 Thus, a state consti-

1. In Watson v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. the United States Supreme Court noted
that a state has a legitimate interest in safeguarding the rights of persons injured within the
state. Watson v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 70-73 (1954). Additionally,
the Court noted that trial in a state does not affect a defendant's due process rights if the
defendant should have known that his actions might bring him into court in the state. Id. If
trial in a state where the defendant should have known he would be liable does not violate
the due process rights of a civil defendant, a criminal trial based on the same argument also
should survive a due process attack.
148. See LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 6.5 (noting that defendants who join conspiracy after
original agreement occurred become members of conspiracy).
149. See supra notes 136-46 (discussing foreseeability as standard for due process violation
in civil context).
150. See George, supra note 7, at 636 (noting that state constitutions may limit extraterritorial penal legislation).
151. See People v. Pascarella, 92 Ill. App. 3d 413, 418, 415 N.E.2d 1285, 1289 (noting
that fourteenth amendment does not require states to provide defendant with right to trial in
district where crime occurred), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 900 (1981). Article three of the United
States Constitution states that every criminal trial shall take place in the state and district in
which the crime occurred. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The sixth amendment to the
Constitution also requires that every defendant have a trial by an impartial jury selected from
the state and district where the crime occurred. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The right to trial
where the crime occurred, however, applies specifically to trials in the federal courts, and no
decision has applied the right to the states. See People v. Pascarella, 92 Ill. App. 3d 413, 418,
415 N.E.2d 1285, 1289 (noting that no court has applied to states federal right to trial where
crime occurred), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 900 (1981).
152. See J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1.6 (West 1986)
(noting that states may exceed federal courts in granting rights to defendants, provided states
do not violate federal law). In McCormick v. State the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of a statute that provided for extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes
occurring outside the state but producing harmful effects within the'state. McCormick v. State,
273 N.W.2d 624, 625 (Minn. 1978). The statute specifically provided for jurisdiction over child
custody disputes when the defendant parent had detained a child outside the state. Id. The
McCormick court noted that the statute conflicted with common-law principles of jurisdiction,
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tution could limit the states' exercise of criminal jurisdiction to crimes that

defendants execute within the states' boundaries.

53

The common-law method of determining criminal jurisdiction by applying the territorial principle is insufficient to resolve the question of juris-

diction over interstate telephonic conspiracies.'5 4 Territorial principles do55
not directly apply because the crime does not occur in a definite place.
Extending territorial principles to include interstate telephonic conspiracies

would place artificial significance on the location of a relatively insignificant
element of the conspiracy. 5 6 Additionally, the territorial principle does not
protect the interests of the states in safeguarding themselves and their
57
citizens from harm that criminals initiate from locations outside the state.
A protective approach to jurisdiction, therefore, would better serve the
interests of the states in prosecuting all conspiracies, including interstate
telephonic conspiracies. 58 Under the protective approach, a state could

exercise jurisdiction over a conspiracy if the conspiracy would have a
criminal effect in the state.15 9 Although no court has addressed directly the
constitutionality of a state's extraterritorial assertion of criminal jurisdiction,
the federal constitution appears to place only minimal due process limitations

which require action within a state for the state to assert jurisdiction. Id. at 626-28. Without
a discussion of the constitutional issues, the court held that extraterritorial jurisdiction contravened both the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and the analogous provision
of the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 628; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing defendant
with right to criminal trial in state and district where crime occurred); MnN. CoNsT. amend.
VI (same). But see Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242, 248-50 (Wyo.) (holding that tenth amendment
to United States Constitution implies that courts can enforce child custody statutes extraterritorially), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 108 (1987). In Rios v. State the Wyoming Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of a child custody statute similar to the statute in McCormick
v. State. Id. at 244. The Rios court reviewed extensively the background and development of
the territorial principle of jurisdiction. Id. at 245-48. The court also noted the large number
of modern exceptions and adaptations to common-law territoriality. Id. The court cited and
rejected the rationale of the McCormick court, and held that substantial precedent and public
policy supported a departure from territorial jurisdiction in some cases. Id. at 246-50. The
Rios court also noted briefly that the tenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
which reserves to the states all powers that the Constitution does not delegate to Congress,
grants the states the power to legislate extraterritorially. Id. at 249.
153. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (noting that state constitutions may
extend defendants' protection beyond federal constitution).
154. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (noting that common-law territorial
jurisdiction does not apply to interstate telephonic conspiracies).
155: See id. (noting that common-law territorial jurisdiction principles do not apply to
interstate telephonic conspiracies because crime does not have discernible situs).
156. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text (discussing use of overt act element of
conspiracy to locate crime in one place and establish territorial jurisdiction).
157. See supra notes 61-81 and accompanying text (discussing state interests in prosecuting
conspiracies and most effective jurisdictional principle that courts should use to achieve state
interests).
158. See supra notes 82-125 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of protective
principle of jurisdiction in serving state interests in prosecuting conspiracies).
159. See id. (discussing application of protective principle to crimes having harmful effects
within state).

1498

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 45:1475

on the states' assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over conspiracies. '6
In sum, a protective approach to the question of jurisdiction over interstate
telephonic conspiracies and over conspiracies in general would advance state
prosecutorial interests more effectively than the traditional common-law
territorial approach.

K.D. KURMAYER

160. See supra notes 126-53 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional limitations
on states' power to legislate extraterritorially).

